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Relocation Law and Survivors of Domestic Violence 
TALLEY WOOD* 
INTRODUCTION  
Imagine that Jane Doe suffered years of physical, emotional, and verbal 
abuse at the hands of her husband, John Doe. Jane and John have three kids, and 
Jane wishes to divorce her abusive husband. The one time she mentioned 
divorcing John and moving out with the kids, Jane suffered severe physical 
abuse at John’s hands. Since then, she has not mentioned divorce and relocation. 
Every day when she comes home from work, she is verbally and emotionally 
abused. She fears that John will physically hurt her at any moment if she does or 
says the wrong thing since he has done so before, so she just keeps quiet. One 
day after work, John comes home and strikes Jane and their children. At that 
moment, Jane knows she has to take her children and leave John in order to keep 
herself and her children safe from harm. Depending on the state she is in, she 
may or may not be able to leave this situation without informing John of where 
exactly she is going if she wants to get custody of the children. She may be able 
to excuse this notice requirement, but if she cannot, she may be charged with 
child kidnapping. Jane’s fate rests in the hands of her state’s law on relocation 
and domestic violence. 
While the above fact pattern is not based on a true story, it is a typical 
situation for many domestic violence survivors, 85% of whom are women.1 
Depending on marital status, prior custody determinations, and applicable state 
law, survivors may have difficulty fleeing violence with their children without 
risking their own or their children’s safety. Domestic violence survivors may 
employ the justice system as a tool to help interrupt abusers’ cycle of violence 
and pattern of abuse.2 When children are involved, however, the justice system 
may not be a friendly forum for survivors who wish to escape the violence. Many 
state courts do not allow survivors to simply flee the state with any children 
without significant legal barriers.3 In such a situation, the fact that a survivor’s 
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 1.  NATIONAL CENTER ON DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, FAQ ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/dv_faqs.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).  
 2.  Carolyn N. Ko, Note, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved Question of 
"Efficacy," 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 370 (2002); Leaigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know 
That For Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 7, 11 (2004).  
 3.  Catherine F. Klein et al., Border Crossings: Understanding the Civil, Criminal, and Immigration 
Implications for Battered Women Fleeing Across State Lines with their Children, 39 FAM. L.Q. 109, 123 
(2005).  
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assailant often knows her destination frustrates the very purpose of relocating.4 
For those survivors, the court may be a forum for further abuse rather than a safe 
haven and a source of control and freedom.5 
Different states have dealt with domestic violence survivors and the laws 
surrounding their relocation in various ways, with no state implementing a 
perfect system.6 The greatest challenges facing survivors wanting to relocate with 
their children are: (1) whether domestic violence is a factor courts consider when 
determining custody, and (2) the presence of a mandatory notification provision. 
This note focuses precisely on these challenges. I will first explore the 
relationship between domestic violence survivors and the courts, then discuss 
the relocation laws of Massachusetts, California, Alabama, and Idaho, and finally 
argue that an amalgamation of the laws of those states is superior to any single 
state’s approach to relocation law as it relates to domestic violence survivors. 
Other important issues surrounding domestic violence and state relocation 
laws—for example, the rights of the father or the rights of the potentially falsely 
accused—are outside the scope of this note. 
I.  SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE COURTS  
The American Bar Association reports that approximately 1.3 million 
women and 835,000 men are physically assaulted by an intimate partner every 
year in the United States.7 Survivors of domestic violence often do not leave their 
abusers initially, and the reasons they stay in the relationship vary drastically.8 
Some of the most common reasons that survivors remain are lack of resources 
and information about escape, continuing love and hope that their abusers will 
change, community pressure, mental health problems, fear of both non-violent 
and violent retribution, and lack of financial resources resulting in dependence 
on the abuser.9 A frequently cited reason that survivors stay in an abusive 
relationship is economic dependency,10 and some have argued that if survivors 
“receive assistance in achieving economic independence, more victims will be 
able to gain safety.”11 In addition, survivors deciding to leave their abusers often 
struggle with the fragmentation of the court system.12 For example, family courts 
may provide orders of safety, custody, and child support whereas district courts 
 
 4.  See id. at 124.   
 5.  See discussion infra Section I.  
 6.  Of course, there will always be debate on whether or not there can even be a perfect system, 
and if there can be, what it would look like. 
 7.  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, Domestic 
Violence Statistics, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/domestic_violence/resources/statistics 
.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
 8.  See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but Divorcing 
the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 201–02 (2008) (listing eight reasons for a victim’s 
failure to leave an abusive relationship and explaining that most do not succeed on their first 
attempt).  
 9.  Id. at 201–02. 
 10.  Emily Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence 
Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1734 (2004).  
 11.  Id. at 1734–35.  
 12.  See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 21 (1999).  
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may assist in the criminal prosecution of the abuser.13 Problematically, each issue 
requires several hearings to reach resolution.14 Thus, domestic violence survivors 
may not be able to commit the time that the legal system demands of its 
participants,15 and they may fail to discover “the multiple and complementary 
options available to them.”16 Moreover, family demands often weigh on 
survivors, making it more difficult for survivors to come into court on multiple 
occasions and “lead[ing] a victim to assign low priority to court proceedings.”17 
Once a survivor uses the justice system as a tool to alter the character of her 
relationship, she may encounter obstacles that extend deeper than the 
fragmentation of the system. Unfortunately, at the root of these obstacles exists 
the reality that “[t]he legal system’s definition of domestic violence and the 
totality of battered women’s experiences of domestic violence bear little 
resemblance to one another.”18 This may be because “the legal system sets the 
standard by which the stories of battered women are judged.”19  This is 
especially problematic because courts have difficulty recognizing the non-
physical abuse cycle of violence, which is also generally invisible in society.20 
Small acts of violence, such as threats and intimidation, do not suffice under the 
legal definition of abuse, but abusers use them nonetheless to establish and 
maintain control of their victims.21 For example, psychological abuse, such as 
name calling and belittling, can be at least as harmful to survivors as physical 
abuse, but the legal system generally does not recognize this as a form of abuse 
sufficient for a civil protection order.22 Showings of abusers’ use of small acts of 
violence and psychological abuse have “virtually no legal standing.”23 
The last major obstacle that stands in the way of domestic violence 
survivors achieving desirable legal results is the way they present in court.24 
Courts often demand survivors to present as meek and mild victims with the 
perfect, single tear trickling down their cheeks at the mention of their abuse.25 
Instead, some survivors have mental health issues, often resulting from the 
 
 13.  Id. at 23–24.  
 14.  See id. at 21 (describing one couple that attended sixteen criminal and family court hearings 
over the course of thirteen months).  
 15.  Id. at 25; see Kohn, supra note 8, at 202.  
 16.  Epstein, supra note 12, at 23.  
 17.  Kohn, supra note 8, at 202.  
 18.  Goodmark, supra note 2, at 28–29.  
 19.  Id. at 30.  
 20.  See Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody Presumptions, 25 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 418, 421 (2005) (“Just as victims and batterers tend to deny and minimize the 
violence, so do courts . . . At other times, courts minimize the effects of the violence by focusing on 
the absence of injuries as an indication that the violence is not significant . . . .”).  
 21.  See Goodmark, supra note 2, at 29.  
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  See Kohn, supra note 8, at 203–06 (discussing how some victims exhibit ambivalence and 
animosity towards the justice system, attempt to return to their abusers, are unreliable witnesses due 
to memory issues, display anger instead of meekness when testifying, and so on). 
 25.  See id. at 204 (“One expects a victim of violence to be meek, scared, and sweet. Victims who 
display anger or lack emotion can pose a challenge for lawyers seeking to hold the offender 
accountable.”); see also Greenberg, supra note 20, at 423–28 (discussing criticisms of victims and the 
effects of those criticisms on the survivors’ court experience).  
Wood_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete) 6/2/2015  10:18 PM 
266 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 22:263 2015 
abuse, or have been disillusioned by their previous experiences with law 
enforcement or the courts.26 They could also be responding to the fear of 
retaliation from their abusers in a way that works best for them, but that may not 
be the way others believe survivors should respond. Thus, because of the 
survivor’s behavior in court, judges may render inappropriate orders.27 The 
negative interactions that survivors have with the court systems often impede 
their desire to use the courts as a tool to leave abusive relationships. This may 
lead to a cyclical effect where the victim resists legal intervention “because she 
harbors a deep distrust of the justice system based on past interactions or 
collective community perceptions,” and the courts lack better understanding of 
domestic violence victims’ situations and behavior because those victims avoid 
the courts.28 
As abusers become more educated about the workings of the legal system, 
they have begun to use the system as an additional forum for abuse.29 They 
summon their victims to court numerous times for various hearings, such as 
modifications, child support, visitation, and violations of civil protection orders, 
effectively restructuring the relationship between the abuser and survivor in a 
way that allows the abuser to maintain control.30 A very important aspect of this 
abuse perpetrated against the justice system occurs when children are involved.  
In these instances, abusers may use the courts as a way to force the survivors to 
maintain contact via their children.31 This harassment is generally not 
preventable, because “courts are rightly reluctant to deprive any litigant of the 
ability to petition the court for redress [and] . . . [a]s a result, batterers routinely 
manipulate the legal system to continue their abuse – a bitter lesson for the 
battered women who puts her trust in that system.”32 Litigation abuse is 
dangerous and potentially detrimental to the survival of the case because it 
 
 26.  Kohn, supra note 8, at 201.  
 27.  See id. at 225 (“Judges too have been influenced by psycho-social theories about domestic 
violence victims and by their own experiences with victim unreliability. Not only do these influences 
have an inevitable impact on credibility determinations in civil and criminal cases, but judges have 
begun denying victims' motions to vacate civil protection orders . . .”).  
 28.  Id. at 203. 
 29.  See Goodmark, supra note 2, at 24 (describing how abusers file civil protection orders that 
mirror those filed by the victims but claiming the violence was directed at them and not the victim); 
Klein et al., supra note 3, at 110 (describing how many survivors face harassment and threats from 
their abusers after they have left, oftentimes in violation of court orders); Greenberg, supra note 20, at 
411–12 (“Abusive relationships usually involve the batterer establishing control over his victim 
through a combination of physical, emotional, and financial methods. . . . Some use the continuing 
connection that comes from joint custody or visitation rights to harass or verbally abuse their 
victims.”).  
 30.  Goodmark, supra note 2, at 34; see Lois Schwaeber, Domestic Violence: The Special Challenge in 
Custody and Visitation Dispute Resolution, 10 No. 8 Divorce Litig. 141 (1998) (“[A]lthough the parties 
had separated, perpetrators, in the pretext of custody and visitation issues, continue to attempt to 
maintain their pattern of coercive control over the abused party and her children.” (citing Evan Stark, 
Framing and Reframing Battered Women, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE 287 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992)).  
 31.  Schwaeber, supra note 30; see Sack, supra note 10, at 1682 (“Perpetrators of domestic violence 
have taken advantage of these changes in the justice system to seek and obtain orders against their 
victims.”); see also Greenberg, supra note 20, at 411 (“Batterers often use any contact afforded them by 
the court as a means of continuing the abusive relationship with their former partners.”).  
 32.  Goodmark, supra note 2, at 34.  
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forces the survivor to repeatedly come into unwanted and uninitiated contact 
with the abuser, thereby increasing the chance that the survivor will drop the 
case in order to cease contact. These abusers intentionally re-victimize the 
survivors as they attempt to strip away what little control the survivors had over 
their own court cases.33 
A majority of female domestic violence victims reside in homes with 
children under 12 years old.34 Additionally, it is estimated that between 3.3 
million and 10 million children witness domestic violence each year.35 Survivors 
cite obtaining custody of the children as one of the most important issues for 
them as they leave an abusive relationship.36 Though some may be able to obtain 
protection by utilizing the legal or social services systems, “survivors fleeing 
their abusers generally face numerous systemic obstacles to attaining the . . . 
security they need during this critical period.”37 Even if a survivor is seeking to 
relocate to escape the violence she has experienced, she often cannot do so 
without the courts intervening and telling her she must stay in the vicinity of the 
abuser or notify him of where she intends to relocate.38 Because “[t]he period 
immediately following an individual’s decision to leave her abusive partner is 
often accompanied by a significant escalation in danger to the safety and welfare 
of the survivor and her children,”39 the safety of the survivor who relocates with 
her children should be a fundamental concern of state law. 
II. MASSACHUSETTS 
Massachusetts law considers domestic violence, or abuse, as a factor when 
making an initial custody award.40 When a domestic violence survivor faces 
custody disputes with the adjudicated legal father41 of their children, the 
 
 33.  See Epstein, supra note 12, at 18 (describing how a batterer’s threat can lead to a victim 
dropping charges, thus giving the batterer control over the case).  
 34.  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 7.  
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Goodmark, supra note 2, at 29.  
 37.  Klein et al., supra note 3, at 109–10.  
 38.  See id. at 110–11 (“Individuals who, without the consent of the other parent, leave with their 
children to confidential locations in or out of their home state may face serious criminal penalties 
under state parental kidnapping statutes.”); see also discussion infra Sections II – V.  
 39.  Klein et al., supra note 3, at 110.  
 40.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 10 (West 2013). Abuse is defined as attempting to cause 
or causing bodily injury or placing another in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury, and a 
serious incident of abuse is defined the same but includes a third option of causing another to engage 
involuntarily in sex acts by force, threat, or duress. Id. § 10(e).  
 41.  Massachusetts sets out very defined parameters for determining custody, especially with 
regard to fathers. Massachusetts distinguishes between children born to unwed mothers and children 
born to married parents, and this distinction is important for a custody determination and legal rights 
to relocation without notice to the father. In Massachusetts, if the parents are married at the time the 
child is born, then the mother’s spouse is the legal father. Id. ch. 209C, § 6. If the parents were not 
married at the time the child was born, without being adjudicated or voluntarily acknowledged as 
the legal father, a putative father has no legal rights regarding the child. Id. § 2; See Smith v. 
McDonald, 941 N.E.2d 1, 10–11 (Mass. 2010) (noting that “[t]he putative biological father has no legal 
rights that need to be protected by the court” when paternity of a nonmarital child has not yet been 
established pursuant to state law.); Even if a putative parent’s name is on the birth certificate, if the 
parents were not married at the time of the birth, that partner is not the legal parent simply because 
Wood_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete) 6/2/2015  10:18 PM 
268 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 22:263 2015 
Custodial Presumption Act (“CPA”) is triggered and applies when the court is 
issuing any temporary or permanent custody order.42 Once a court finds that 
there is a pattern of abuse or serious incident of abuse,43 the CPA creates a 
rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child for the abuser 
to have any sort of custody, whether physical or legal.44  However, the Act is not 
a guarantee that a legal father who perpetrated violence against the child’s 
mother will not be chosen as a custodial parent.45 Since the Act only gives rise to 
a rebuttable presumption against custody with the perpetrator, the perpetrator 
can overcome that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence and still 
gain custody. This presumption serves to protect mothers while also protecting 
fathers’ rights, but may also result in survivors of domestic violence being forced 
to share custody with the perpetrators. 
Massachusetts requires the consent of both legal parents, including the 
noncustodial parent, for a parent to relocate with the child, “unless the court 
upon cause shown otherwise orders.”46 Domestic violence is not a statutory factor 
for the cause shown prong, nor is it mentioned in the statute at all.47  Notice is 
thus required when the custodial parent seeks relocation unless the court finds 
cause shown in some other factor besides domestic violence.48 In that case, the 
custodial parent can relocate without providing notification.49 
Massachusetts case law makes a distinction in relocation law between 
situations involving sole physical and legal custody, joint physical and legal 
custody, and sole physical custody but joint legal custody. Prior to any legal 
determination of paternity, the mother has sole physical and legal custody.50 
Thus, she can relocate as she wishes without notifying the father. Even if there is 
a paternity determination after the mother has relocated, the mother is not 
required to return to Massachusetts because she did not have to seek permission 
 
of the birth certificate. See Smith, 941 N.E.2d  at 7 (noting that a putative father of a nonmarital child 
may only become a legal parent “through an adjudication or by filing a voluntary acknowledgement 
of paternity executed by both parties.”). “Once paternity is established, however, the father, if not 
unfit, has a constitutionally protected right to parent and maintain a relationship with his child.” Id. 
Thus, for children born out of wedlock, in order to award custody to the father, there must be an 
adjudication of paternity. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 10 (West 2013). Without an adjudication 
or voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, the mother has custody; thus, perpetrators of domestic 
violence who were never adjudicated as the father and were not married to the mother at the child’s 
birth have no legal rights to prevent the mother from relocating with her child. Id.  
 42.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31(a) (West 2013).  
 43.  The law defines abuse, or a serious incident of abuse, as an act between a parent and parent 
or a parent and child that (1) attempts to cause bodily injury, (2) places someone in reasonable fear of 
imminent bodily injury, or (3) causes someone to engage in forced sexual relations or sexual relations 
under duress or threat. Id.  
 44.  Id. ch. 209C, § 10(e).  
 45.  See id.  
 46.  Id. ch. 208, § 30 (emphasis added).  
 47.   Id.; David M. Cotter, Relocation of the Custodial Parent: A State-By-State Survey, 18 No. 6 
DIVORCE LITIG. 89, 99–101 (2006).  
 48.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 10 (West 2013).  
 49.  Id. The custodial parent can also relocate without notice if the father was never adjudicated 
to be the legal father and if the parents were not married at the time of the child’s birth. See discussion 
supra note 43.  
 50.  Smith v. McDonald, 941 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Mass. 2010).  
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for the move at the time of her relocation.51 
When divorced parents have joint physical and legal custody, the cause 
shown prong of Ch. 208 § 30 is satisfied by showing that removal is in the best 
interests of the child.52 When physical custody is shared, a judge is less willing to 
allow parents to freely relocate with the children.53 The best interests standard is 
still applied in situations with joint physical and legal custody, but it becomes 
harder for one parent to show that the move is in the best interests of a child.54 
However, if the move is shown to be in the child’s best interest, the court may 
waive the notice requirement.55 
When parents do not share physical custody, and the parent with sole 
physical custody wishes to remove the child from the state without the consent 
of the other parent, the cause shown prong is still satisfied by showing that the 
move is in the best interests of the child.56 Massachusetts allows relocation with a 
minor child if one parent can show good, sincere reasons for the relocation. Then, 
the judge weighs the mother, father, and children’s interests to determine the 
best interests of the child.57  In these situations, the primary inquiry is whether 
there is a good reason, or a real advantage, for the move.58 If the court determines 
that there is a real advantage, taking into consideration all relevant parties, then 
the need for parental consent to relocate is eliminated.59 
If the parents were never married, and at least one parent has physical 
custody but they share legal custody, the Yannas and Mason tests are still 
applicable.60 Children of non-married parents are “entitled to the same rights and 
protections of the law as other children,”61 because the purpose of the removal 
statute “is to preserve the rights of the noncustodial parent and the child to 
maintain and develop their familial relationships, while balancing those rights 
with the right of the custodial parent to seek a better life for himself or herself in 
another State or country.”62 
If the survivor and abuser share legal custody and the survivor does not 
 
 51.  See id. at 10 (holding that the judge’s conclusion that the mother was required to obtain the 
consent of the father before relocating the child was erroneous.).  
 52.  Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Mass. 2006); Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481 
N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Mass. 1985).  
 53.  Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 519.  
 54.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 10 (West 2013).  
 55.  See Mason, 850 N.E.2d at 515 (holding that the appropriate standard when parents have joint 
physical and legal custody means showing that removal is in the “best interest” of the child).  
 56.  Yannas, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. Simply because the move is in the best interest of the custodial 
parent does not mean it is in the best interests of the child. Id.  
 57.  Id.; Tammaro v. O’Brien, 921 N.E.2d 127, 133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010).  
 58.  See Yannas, 481 N.E.2d at 1158 (“If the custodial parent establishes a good, sincere reason for 
wanting to remove to another jurisdiction, none of the relevant factors becomes controlling in 
deciding the best interests of the child[.]”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 30 (West 2013).   
 59.  See Yannas, 481 N.E.2d at 1158 (noting that the Massachusetts removal statute provides that 
“[a] minor child of divorced parents who is a native of . . . this commonwealth . . . shall not, if of 
suitable age to signify his consent, be removed out of this.”).  
 60.  See Wakefield v. Hegarty, 857 N.E.2d 32, 35–36 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (reviewing the 
application of the “read advantage” test).  
 61.  Id. at 35; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 1 (West 2013).  
 62.  Wakefield, 857 N.E.2d at 36.   
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seek a court’s assistance in dismissing that requirement, the survivor may be 
charged with parental kidnapping if she removes the child without permission.63 
A major concern therefore is that if survivors do not feel comfortable in seeking 
legal intervention with regard to removal and relocation of children, they may 
either (1) leave without seeking permission from the legal father, or (2) remain in 
a violent situation when it would be better for both them and their child to leave. 
Under the current law, however, a domestic violence survivor must either seek 
to waive the permission requirement or stay in Massachusetts absent a waiver 
from a judge. 
III. CALIFORNIA  
The California Family Code protects victims of domestic violence who seek 
custody of their children in § 3044.64 Once a court finds that a party seeking 
custody has perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking 
custody, the child, or the child’s siblings within the past five years, “there is a 
rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of 
a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the 
best interest of the child.”65 The presumption is rebuttable by a preponderance of 
the evidence.66 Factors a court may consider in rebutting the presumption 
include whether the perpetrator has completed a batterer’s intervention 
program, whether the perpetrator has completed a parenting class, and whether 
there is a protective order in place.67 California also specifically defines domestic 
violence for the purpose of the § 3044 presumption.68 The perpetration of 
domestic violence requires a finding by the court that the perpetrator has 
intentionally or recklessly caused or attempted to cause bodily harm or sexual 
assault, or has “placed a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious 
bodily injury to that person or to another . . . .”69 Lastly, the code lists a series of 
acts that are also included in this definition of domestic violence.70 Noticeably 
missing is any mention of acts of non-physical domestic violence.  
California child relocation law builds upon the custody determination law. 
While domestic violence is not specifically mentioned in relocation law,71 the 
relocation laws are founded on the court’s previous determination of custody.72 
Sections 3006 and 3007 define sole legal and sole physical custody, and 
“recognize the general right of a parent with sole custody to supervise and make 
 
 63.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 26(a) (West 2013).   
 64.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2013).  
 65.  Id. § 3044(a).  
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. § 3044(b).  
 68.  Id. § 3044(c).  
 69.  Id.  
 70.  The acts include intentionally or recklessly: causing or attempting to cause bodily injury or 
sexual assault, placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that 
person or another person, or engaging in any behavior including, but not limited to, threatening, 
striking, harassing, destroying personal property, or disturbing the peace of another. Id.  
 71.  See id. §§ 3041, 7501.  
 72.  See id. § 7501. 
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decisions regarding a child’s residence and education.”73  Section 7501 outlines 
the general rule that a parent with custody has the right to change the residence 
of the child.74 That right is subject to the power of the court to prohibit a removal 
that would hurt the rights or welfare of the child.75 Consequently, this section 
essentially provides for a presumption in favor of relocation by the custodial 
parent.76 However, it “contemplates that even a parent with sole legal and 
physical custody may be restrained from changing a child’s residence, if a court 
determines the change would be detrimental to the child’s rights or welfare.”77 
Thus, California’s relocation statute absorbs its policy on domestic violence 
and child custody.  If a parent already has custody, then § 3044 has already done 
its work.  Because of the strong policy in § 3044 against perpetrators of domestic 
violence, the presumption works to help ensure that survivors are protected 
from their abusers having custody of their children, and thus having continued 
contact with the survivors themselves.78 Even though California relocation law 
does not explicitly list domestic violence as a factor to consider, this has 
previously been considered in cases of custody arrangement. Perpetrators of 
domestic violence are less likely to have any sort of custody of their children, so 
survivors are relatively free to relocate with their children. 
Problems with relocation arise when a survivor is required by law to give 
notice to the other parent, or the perpetrator of the violence, when she intends to 
relocate with the children. California law requires that the parent seeking 
relocation give notice to the other parent of the change of residence of the child.79 
The potential harsh result of this legal requirement on survivors is ameliorated 
by the qualification that the court does not have to impose a notice requirement if 
the court considers it inappropriate.80 Thus, the requirement seems somewhat 
permissive rather than mandatory, as courts may require the party seeking 
relocation to provide notice more than 45 days in advance of the anticipated 
move.81 Without court intervention, the only way a party seeking relocation does 
not have to provide notice to the other party is if there was a prior written 
agreement stipulating as much.82 
Generally, every time a survivor decides to relocate to escape her batterer, 
the notice requirement has the potential to be detrimental to the survivor’s 
primary object of removing herself from a violent relationship. Alerting her 
abuser to the exact location of her new address could frustrate the purpose of the 
move altogether. However, California lessens the harshness of a notice 
requirement in two primary ways: (1) by allowing the court to eliminate the 
requirement if appropriate, and (2) by not explicitly requiring that the party 
 
 73.  In re Marriage of Brown and Yana, 127 P.3d 28, 33 (Cal. 2006).  
 74.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501(a) (West 2013).  
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Cotter, supra note 47, at 92–93.  
 77.  Brown, 127 P.3d at 33.  
 78.  See Greenberg, supra note 20, at 411 (discussing how batterers use custody proceedings and 
determinations to stay in contact with and potentially continue to abuse their victims).  
 79.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3024 (West 2013).  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id.  
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seeking relocation provide her new address to the other party.83 In this way, 
California protects the interests of non-violent parents and their rights to their 
children by requiring notice of relocation within those families, but it also 
protects the safety and autonomy of domestic violence survivors by giving the 
court a way out of requiring that these women provide notice and a specific new 
address to their abusers. 
The case law in California bolsters the statutory protection of survivors who 
seek to relocate with their children. First, the case law provides for two different 
standards depending on the stage of a particular custody order.84 In an initial 
custody preceding, the standard is the best interests of the child.85 Under 
California Family Code § 3011, abuse by one parent against the other is a factor 
to consider when determining the best interests of the child.86 Additionally, as 
discussed above, there is a presumption against awarding custody to a parent 
who is a perpetrator of domestic violence.87 Courts must consider all relevant 
circumstances that bear on the best interests of the child when making these 
initial custody determinations,88 and it cannot be doubted that domestic violence 
bears on the best interests of the child. Additionally, in California initial custody 
proceedings, the parent seeking to relocate does not bear the burden of showing 
that the move is necessary.89 
For altering custody orders that have already been finalized, the standard is 
a change of circumstance standard rather than the best interests of the child 
standard.90 Under the change of circumstances standard, relocation is 
appropriate only if the parent seeking the custody modification can demonstrate 
a significant change in circumstance showing that relocation is in the child’s best 
interests.91 The policy at play in this shift of standards is the recognition of a need 
for continuity and stability in custody arrangements, as well as understanding 
the harm that can result from disrupting a custody arrangement and displacing 
who cares for the child.92  This policy is derived from In re Marriage of Burgess 
and was codified as official California public policy in CAL. FAM. CODE § 
7501(b).93 Under this standard, the initial burden of proof is on the noncustodial 
parent to show that the move would be detrimental to the child.94 The fact that 
the initial burden of proof is not on the relocating parent aligns with the 
 
 83.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3024 (West 2013).  
 84.  See Keith R. v. Superior Court of Orange County, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 298, 299–300 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009) (noting the application of the “changed circumstances” standard and the “best interest” rule to 
a move-away order in a child custody case); In re Marriage of Brown and Yana, 127 P.3d 28, 32–33 
(Cal. 2006) (describing the “changed circumstances rule,” a variation on the “best interest standard”).   
 85.  Keith R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 300. Initial custody orders also include domestic violence orders. 
Id.; CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(b) (West 2013).  
 86.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(b)(2) (West 2013).  
 87.  See discussion supra p. 9; Id. § 3044.  
 88.  In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478 (Cal. 1996).  
 89.  Id. at 476.  
 90.  See generally id.; In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004).  
 91.  In re Marriage of Brown and Yana, 127 P.3d 28, 33 (Cal. 2006).  
 92.  See id. (“Not only does this [policy] serve to protect the weighty interest in stable custody 
arrangements, but it also fosters judicial economy.”).  
 93.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501(b) (West 2013).  
 94.  In re Marriage of Morgan, No. A126715, slip op. at 7 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2010).  
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determination in § 7501 that a parent with custody has the right to determine 
where the child lives.95 Once that initial burden has been carried, the best 
interests test is applied, and all relevant facts are considered in their totality.96 
Thus, the custodial parent’s right to change the child’s residence is “a 
presumptive right” which might fail “if the move would result in detriment to 
the child.”97 
On its face, this change of circumstances standard on its face seems 
advantageous for domestic violence survivors. If the noncustodial parent will 
generally be the abuser, and that parent carries the initial burden of proof, then it 
seems like the custodial parent has much less work to do to successfully relocate 
with a child after a final custody order has already been entered. However, 
California case law allows for courts to account for whether a reason for the 
proposed relocation is to lessen contact with the noncustodial parent.98 This is 
actually detrimental for survivors, because if a survivor wants to relocate, one of 
her reasons may be fear for herself and for her children. Thus, she may actually 
want to lessen contact with the noncustodial parent, and that is potentially 
sufficient to change custody to the noncustodial parent.99 Despite this concern, 
since the best interests standard comes into play after the noncustodial parent 
carries his burden, and that standard includes domestic violence as a factor,100 
California law takes this concern into account and provides outlets for survivors 
of domestic violence so they do not get caught in legislative traps. 
Overall, California’s removal law considers domestic violence concerns and 
does not seem like it would endanger the safety of domestic violence survivors 
seeking relocation with their children. While notice to the other party is required, 
a court can determine that notice is inappropriate under the circumstances.101 
This notice also does not require the survivor to include her intended new 
address, so the perpetrator would not necessarily have access to her new 
residence.102 Within the best interests standard, used in both initial custody 
proceedings and after the noncustodial parent has carried his burden in 
modifications of final custody orders, there is a statutory consideration of 
domestic violence.103 Lastly, the presumption against awarding custody to a 
perpetrator of domestic violence is a heavy-lifting provision of California law 
that does a lot of work in favor of domestic violence survivors at the beginning of 
custody determinations, allowing them more autonomy later to decide whether 
or not to relocate their children.104 The primary concern with California 
relocation law and domestic violence is that courts can consider leaving the 
noncustodial parent as a reason for relocating, but this is ameliorated by the later 
 
 95.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 2013).  
 96.  Morgan, No. A126715 at 7.  
 97.  Brown, 127 P.3d at 33 (quoting In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478 (Cal. 1996).  
 98.  In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81, 99 (Cal. 2004).  
 99.  See id.  
 100.  See discussion supra p. 12; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(b)(2) (West 2013).  
 101.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3024 (West 2013).  
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. § 3011(b)(2).   
 104.  See id. §§ 3044, 7501.  
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application of the best interests standard.105 Thus, California law is friendly to 
survivors and understanding of the legal issues they face when relocating. 
IV. ALABAMA  
Alabama provides strong statutory protection of domestic violence victims 
who are seeking custody. Firstly, a determination of domestic or family abuse 
raises a rebuttable presumption that “custody with [the] perpetrator [is] 
detrimental to the child.”106 Similarly, there is a mirrored presumption in favor of 
the child residing with the non-perpetrator of domestic violence.107 Importantly, 
the statute says that if domestic or family violence has been determined, there is 
a rebuttable presumption that the child should live with the non-perpetrating 
parent “in the location of the parent’s choice, within or outside the state.”108 
However, Alabama statutory law contains a presumption against relocation: 
relocation is presumed not to be in the best interests of the child.109 The party 
seeking the change has the initial burden of proof, and that burden shifts to the 
non-relocating party if the initial burden is met.110 However, if there is a 
determination that the party objecting to relocation has committed domestic 
violence, that presumption no longer applies to relocation cases.111 
Additionally, with relocation cases, the person who has the right to establish 
the principal residence of the child must give notice to any other party entitled to 
custody of a proposed change of the child’s principal residence.112 The form of 
this notice is stipulated in another section of the Code: (1) the notice must be 
given not later than the forty-fifth day before the intended move or (2) the notice 
must be given on the tenth day after the information becomes known if the 
person did not know in time to comply with the forty-five day rule and could not 
reasonably have known in time, and the time of the move cannot be extended, 
and (3) the notice must include the new address and mailing address, new phone 
number, child’s school, reason for the move, and a notice of an opportunity for 
the other party to object, and (4) the relocating party has a continuing obligation 
to provide updated information as it becomes available.113 
While it seems as though Alabama statutory law provides reasonable 
protection for victims of domestic violence who wish to relocate, the case law on 
the issue is relatively sparse. The courts in Alabama have come across many 
relocation scenarios in which the mother seeks to relocate, the father opposes the 
move, and the court applies the presumption against relocation since the father 
was not found to have perpetrated domestic violence.114 In one such case, the 
 
 105.  See id. § 3011.  
 106.  ALA. CODE § 30-3-131 (2014).  
 107.  Id. § 30-3-133.  
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id. § 30-3-169.4.  
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id. § 30-3-163.  
 113.  Id. § 30-3-165.  
 114.  See e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 978 So.2d 36, 42 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); see also Toler v. 
Toler, 947 So.2d 416, 421 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).  
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court found that “[b]ecause the father objected to the change in residence and had 
not been found to have committed domestic violence or child abuse, it was the mother’s 
burden to rebut the presumption that the change in residence she was seeking 
for the children would not be in the children’s best interests.”115 In another case, 
the court said, “There is no evidence indicating that the father committed 
domestic violence or child abuse . . . Thus, as the father correctly notes, there was 
a rebuttable presumption that a change of the son’s principal residence was not 
in the son’s best interests.”116 
Therefore, while courts in Alabama do not seem to have encountered the 
specific issue of relocation where domestic violence has been perpetrated, the 
case law shows that courts do consider domestic violence as a factor when 
applying the presumption.117 This is important for survivors because if and when 
Alabama courts encounter a case with domestic violence, their case law can be 
used to demonstrate that the presumption against relocation should not be 
applied in that case, despite the fact that there has not yet been a specific case on 
point. The assumption is that if the presumption were not applied, then under 
Alabama law, the custodial parent would be free to relocate without having to 
prove that the move is in the best interests of the child. 
Additionally, Alabama courts consistently apply the presumptions 
contained in §§ 30-3-131 and 30-3-133, awarding custody to those parents who 
have not perpetrated domestic violence.118 Presumably, since Alabama promotes 
the right of a non-perpetrator of domestic violence to live “in the location of the 
parent’s choice, within or outside the state,”119 survivors who wish to relocate 
after domestic violence may do so freely. Notice, however, may still be an issue 
even with these presumptions. Despite the potential for removing the 
presumption against relocation in domestic violence cases and the presumption 
in favor of the non-violent party having custody of the children, Alabama’s 
relocation law is problematic for survivors. The notice provision is the primary 
struggle, as there is not a statutorily created channel to evade the requirement of 
detailed notice to the opposing party. Thus, if survivors seek to relocate with 
their children in order to escape the violence, they may run into serious hurdles 
that jeopardize their safety when they are statutorily required to send notice of 
relocation to the opposing party. 
V. IDAHO  
Idaho has taken a very strong public policy stance regarding domestic 
violence, which is evidenced by their establishment of domestic violence courts 
 
 115.  Henderson, 978 So.2d at 42 (emphasis added).  
 116.  Toler, 947 So.2d at 421 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 117.  See e.g., Henderson, 978 So.3d at 42.  
 118.  See Washington v. Washington, 24 So.3d 1126, 1134 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (noting that trial 
courts are required to apply the presumption unless one of the three circumstances outlined in 
McCelland v. McCelland, 841 So.2d 1264, 1267 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) exist.). For an example of an 
unsuccessful attempt to apply the presumptions of ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-131 and 30-3-133 when no 
domestic violence was found to have occurred, see Lamb v. Lamb, 939 So.2d 918, 923 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2006).   
 119.  ALA. CODE § 30-3-133 (2014).  
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that are separate from the state’s civil and criminal court systems.120 Idaho 
acknowledges that specific courts dedicated to domestic violence “hold offenders 
accountable, increase victim safety, provide greater judicial monitoring, and 
coordinate information to provide effective interaction and use of resources 
among courts . . . .”121 In addition to determining that “domestic violence is a 
serious crime that causes substantial damage to victims and children,” Idaho also 
recognizes that “[f]amilies experiencing domestic violence are often involved in 
more than one court proceeding,” so “[s]ubstantial state and county resources 
are required each year for the incarceration, supervision and treatment of 
batterers.”122 The Idaho legislature has found that “[d]omestic violence courts 
have proven effective in reducing recidivism and increasing victim safety,” so 
“[i]t is in the best interests of the citizens of this state to expand domestic 
violence courts to each judicial district.”123 Because of this strong stance against 
domestic violence and in favor of effectively utilizing the court systems to help 
survivors, Idaho has a system uniquely tailored to combatting domestic violence. 
In addition to the separate court system, Idaho also has other provisions or 
statutes to assist with protecting survivors in their custody proceedings. When 
determining what is in the best interests of the child in Idaho, domestic violence 
is one factor to consider.124  Idaho requires that “[t]he father and mother of a 
legitimate unmarried minor are equally entitled to its custody . . . .”125 Thus, 
there is a presumption for joint custody unless one of the parents is a habitual 
perpetrator of domestic violence.126 In that case “[t]here shall be a presumption 
that joint custody is not in the best interests of the child . . . .”127 
Regarding relocation, Idaho has a statute defining child custody 
interference as intentionally taking a child away from someone else that has 
either custody rights, visitation rights, or other legal rights to the child.128 This is 
a felony if the perpetrator moves across state lines. This statute could capture 
many survivors who attempt to relocate with their children, effectively rendering 
them kidnappers and potential felons. Fortunately, fleeing from harm, i.e. 
domestic violence, is an affirmative defense.129  Additionally, consent from the 
other parent is a defense, which implies that there is a notice requirement for 
parents who wish to relocate with their children.130 Idaho otherwise does not 
have any statutory law that directly bears on the issue of relocation of children. 
Case law has come to fill the gap left by the legislature regarding relocation 
of children. In every situation in which the question of where a child should 
reside arises, including relocation, the best interest standard governs,131 because 
 
 120.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1408 (West 2013).  
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Id.  § 32-1408(1).  
 123.  Id. § 32-1408(3).  
 124.  Id. § 32-717(g).  
 125.  Id. § 32-1007.  
 126.  Id. § 32-717B(5).  
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. § 18-4506.  
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. § 18-4506(2)(c).  
 131.  Bartosz v. Jones, 197 P.3d 310, 315, 317–18 (Idaho 2008); Roberts v. Roberts, 64 P.3d 327, 329–
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“[i]n Idaho, the child’s best interest is of paramount importance in child custody 
decisions.”132 The parent seeking to move, “[w]hen a move would violate an 
existing custody arrangement,”133 bears the burden in showing that the move is 
in the best interests of the child.134 Notably, courts must account for Idaho’s 
presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in frequent contact 
with both parents, unless one is a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence.135 
However, this “presumption in favor of joint custody is not equivalent to a 
presumption against a custodial parent relocating with a child.”136 A custodial 
parent must only establish that the move is in the best interests of the child, and 
then she will be permitted to move with the child.137 Importantly, Idaho courts 
have implied that it is not in the best interest of a child to live with someone who 
has a history of committing domestic violence.138 
Since Idaho relocation law is based on the best interests of the child, and 
because there are separate domestic violence courts and a strong policy against 
domestic violence, Idaho has a very protective legal framework for survivors of 
domestic violence. The domestic violence courts themselves give hope to 
survivors that the justice system is responsive to their specific needs and 
increases the likelihood that the justice system is able to make decisions that will 
not put the survivors at risk for further abuse. Additionally, notice is not 
statutorily imposed, so survivors may be able to relocate if they can show that 
the move is in the child’s best interest. Under Idaho case law, it is probably not in 
the child’s best interest for an abuser to have custody, so the best interests 
standard protects survivors in this way as well.139  While the custody interference 
is indeed a concern for survivors who choose to relocate their children without 
consent of the other parent, they have an affirmative defense if they were fleeing 
from violence.140 While this would not in and of itself eliminate the criminal 
charges against the survivor, it would afford her some ground to fight the 
charges. Ultimately, because the best interests standard dominates relocation, a 
survivor should be able to go into court and get a determination that it is in the 
best interests for her to relocate away from violence with her child without ever 
risking her own safety to do so. 
VI. SYNTHESIS OF STATE LAW AND SURVIVOR SAFETY 
Survivors of domestic violence pose a unique challenge to relocation law. It 
may not be safe for them to comply with the usual state law requirements, 
 
30, 331 (Idaho 2003).  
 132.  Bartosz, 197 P.3d at 315.  
 133.  Bartosz, 197 P.3d at 315.  
 134.  Id.; Roberts, 64 P.3d at 331. As there is no Idaho law on point, Idaho courts consulted 
California and New York law to determine their own relocation standard. Bartosz, 197 P.3d at 316.  
 135.  Bartosz, 197 P.3d at 315; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B (West 2013).  
 136.  Bartosz, 197 P.3d at 317.  
 137.  Id. at 317–18 (citing Roberts, 64 P.3d at 331).  
 138.  See Schultz v. Schultz, 187 P.3d 1234, 1240 (Idaho 2008) (“The record does not support that 
Sylvia’s best interests would be served by removing her from a stable home with a support network 
and returning her to the custody of a father with a history of domestic abuse.”) (emphasis added).  
 139.  See id. 
 140.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4506 (West 2013).  
Wood_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete) 6/2/2015  10:18 PM 
278 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 22:263 2015 
especially advance notice to the noncustodial parent. Because abusers often use 
the court system as an additional forum to continue the domestic abuse,141 
survivors need laws that allow them to act in a way that keeps them and their 
children safe, while refraining from obstructing the parental rights of the abuser 
as much as possible. The four states discussed all approach relocation law and its 
potential intersection with domestic violence survivors differently, and each state 
offers positive tools for survivors as they seek to relocate with their children and 
flee from violence. However, no state has a comprehensive law that affords 
survivors complete protection from potential future violence. Thus, an 
amalgamation of features from each of the four states would create the most 
satisfactory protective law for survivors. 
Idaho’s domestic violence courts serve as the best forum for any custody 
proceeding where a survivor is involved.142 Because of the unique challenges 
facing survivors, it is important to have a legal system that supports them and 
understands their legal concerns. If domestic violence is ever to be effectively 
combatted by the judicial system, the system needs to fully understand how to 
adjudicate proceedings where domestic violence is involved, including custody 
and relocation proceedings. 
In initial custody proceedings, all four states consider domestic violence143 
as a factor when determining which parent gets custody of the child. The best 
formulation of this factor consideration is in the form of a statutory presumption, 
as it allows this factor to weigh more heavily in the mind of the court than some 
other factors. Massachusetts, California, and Alabama all have a presumption 
that it is not in the child’s best interests to live with a parent who has committed 
domestic violence, in various forms, against another parent.144 The best 
articulation of this principle comes from Alabama in its mirror presumptions.145 
By not limiting the occurrence of domestic violence to any particular time frame, 
Alabama creates broader protection for survivors who previously experienced an 
incidence of domestic violence. Additionally, the dual presumptions leave less 
room for judicial error, as they work together to ensure that perpetrators of 
domestic violence should not presumptively obtain custody of their children. 
Regarding relocation, California has a presumption for relocation by the 
custodial parent,146 Alabama had a presumption against relocation by the 
custodial parent,147 while Massachusetts and Idaho had no presumption at all. If 
there is a presumption against perpetrators of domestic violence having custody 
of children, then most survivors will have custody. Thus, a presumption in favor 
of relocation by the custodial parent will be most beneficial to survivors who 
wish to relocate with their children. With a presumption at play, survivors will 
 
 141.  See discussion supra p. 6–7.  
 142.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1408 (West 2013).  
 143.  Domestic violence falls under “harmful parental misconduct” in South Dakota. See 
Fuerstenberg v. Fuerstenberg, 591 N.W.2d 798, 809 (S.D. 1999) (discussing harmful parental 
misconduct).  
 144.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31(a) (West 2013); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2013); 
ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-131, 30-3-133 (2014).  
 145.  ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-131, 30-3-133 (2014).  
 146.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 2013).  
 147.  ALA. CODE § 30-3-169.4 (2014).  
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generally be able to move with their children easily and without interference, 
and the potential for further abuse, from the noncustodial abuser. To protect the 
rights of the abuser, the presumption would be rebuttable by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and the presumption additionally would not come into effect if the 
move would jeopardize the welfare of the child. 
The primary safety issue confronting survivors who wish to relocate is 
notice to the noncustodial parent. Massachusetts’ approach to relocation law 
centers on the adjudication of paternity.148 This is beneficial for survivors because 
it allows them a legal opportunity to escape any sort of potential notice 
requirement if their abuser was never (1) married to the survivor at the time of 
the birth, thus not the legal father of the child, and (2) adjudicated or voluntarily 
acknowledged as the father.149 However, if the father does have paternal rights, 
mandatory notice of relocation may not be in the best interests of the child or the 
survivor as the abuser would have access for further abuse. 
In the family where no violence occurs, notice of relocation to the 
noncustodial parent is reasonable as well as encouraged. In those families, the 
relocation by the custodial parent is not to enhance her safety by escaping the 
abuse and violence of the noncustodial parent. Rather, it is for a myriad of other 
reasons, including jobs, schools, work, and new relationships. When survivors 
seek to relocate with their children, they may be trying to escape the violence and 
keep themselves and their children safe. In those instances, mandatory notice to 
the noncustodial parent could put their safety into question. Thus, a judicial 
approach where notice is excused in the case of a survivor is preferred. 
California requires notice of relocation to the noncustodial parent “if the 
court does not consider it inappropriate.”150 This would be an adequate notice 
provision as it recognizes the general need for notice of relocation while allowing 
the court to take into consideration situations and circumstances in which notice 
is inappropriate, such as in the case of a survivor fleeing violence. This standard, 
however, falls slightly short because it implies that the survivor would have to 
seek court approval before moving. If a survivor was to flee violence with her 
children prior to a court proceeding, she may violate the notice requirement. A 
statute that allows for retroactive approval of abandoning the notice requirement 
is preferable to maintain the safety of survivors.151 
CONCLUSION  
Because of the unique social and legal challenges that survivors of domestic 
violence face, it is critical to their safety that our court systems are a forum for 
help and protection for those women rather than a source of confusion and 
anxiety. State laws that require notice from the survivor to her abuser when she 
 
 148.  See discussion supra p. 7–8; see also supra note 41.  
 149.  See discussion supra p. 7–8; see also supra note 41.  
 150.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3024 (West 2013).  
 151.  Additionally, survivors who possess a valid and enforceable protection order against the 
noncustodial parent may also escape liability for the notice requirement, regardless of when they 
relocate. While South Dakota was not discussed in this Note, it contains this provision in its statutory 
law. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-17 (West 2014) (“No notice need be provided pursuant to this 
section if . . . (3) There is an existing valid protection order in favor of the child or the custodial parent 
against the noncustodial parent . . . .”).  
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relocates with her children and that ultimately do not recognize the effects of 
domestic violence on the survivors do not help those women flee to safety. In 
fact, many state laws serve to force survivors to stay in close proximity to danger 
if they wish to remain with their children. In looking to the future, states should 
implement laws that understand domestic violence survivors’ challenges and 
help them lead a safe and happy life.  
